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From the Bankruptcy Courts
Benjamin Weintraub* and Alan N. Resnick**

A Bank's Right to Place an
Administrative Hold on a Debtor's
Deposit Accour,~t Upon the Filing of
a Bankruptcy Petition: An Issue
Revisited

The automatic stay' is designed
to protect a debtor-in-possession
against any interference with its
property by any entity until the
bankruptcy court has had the opportunity of deciding the respective
rights of the parties. In chapter ll,
the stay plays an important role in
allowing the debtor-in-possession
(DIP) to maintain its business by
continuing its manufacturing, selling its products, and utilizing its
bank deposits in connection with its
operations in accordance with the
provisions of the Bankruptcy Code.
An old problem that concerns institutional lenders and ·DIPs has
come to life again: To what extent
may a bank freeze a DIP's bank
account against which the bank has
a prepetition right of setoff by indi* Special Counsel to the law firm of
Kaye, Scholer, Fierman, Hays & Handler,
New York, N.Y.; member of the National
Bankruptcy Conference.
**Benjamin Weintraub Distinguished
Professor of Bankruptcy Law, Hofstra University School of Law, Hempstead, N.Y.;
Counsel to the law firm of Fried, Frank,
Harris, Shriver & Jacobson, New York,
N.Y.; member of the National Bankruptcy
Conference.
1
See 11 U.S.C. § 362.

eating in its record the simple words
''administrative hold''? This designation is meant to render the account
inactive until the bankruptcy court
determines the rights of the parties
to the deposit. Ia
A Simple Complication
In In re Quality Interiors, Inc. ,Z
the bankruptcy court had for consideration a motion by Quality Inter~
ors, Inc. (the DIP) for an order
seeking to release the administrative
hold by the Western Reserve Bank
(Bank) of its bank accounts or in the
alternative to use the cash collateral.
Additionally, the court had for further consideration its previous order
granting a replacement lien. 3 The
court treated the motion as a motion
to use. cash collateral and sustained
it in part, subject to a final hearing
on the use of cash collateral if the
hearing was necessary.
The court began by characterizing the issues as ''relatively simple''
but' 'complicated by competing pol1
• [Editor's Note: For a more extensive
treatment of the judicial background to this
problem, see the article in this issue at 228:
Coleman, Garrett & Freidman, "Administrative Freeze: Creditor's Overreaching or
Prudent Banking?'']
2
127 Bankr. 391 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio
1991).
3 /d. at 392.
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icies of the Bankruptcy Code.' ' 4 The
issues were (1) whether an administrative freeze placed on the DIP's
account by the Bank constituted a
violation of the automatic stay under
Section 362 and (2) to what extent
did the bank have a right of setoff
in funds on deposit and to what
extent did these funds constitute
cash collateral under the Bankruptcy Code.
On October 23, 1990, Quality
Interiors, a producer and installer of
drywall and plaster, filed a petition
under chapter -11. At that time,
Quality Interiors maintained two deposit accounts at the Bank, a general
operating account and a payroll account. Prior to filing, Quality Interiors was obligated to the Bank on
outstanding note obligations that at
the time of filing exceeded the aggregate amount of the two deposit
accounts.
On the very next day, the DIP,
following its weekly custom, transferred funds from its general account to its payroll account for payment of its payroll. This transfer
was by check drawn by the DIP
on its general account payable to
"Quality Interiors, Inc. (Payroll
Account)" in the amount of$7 ,600.
The payr_oll checks and one check
drawn on the general account were
subsequently retl.!med to the DIP
with notices of insufficient funds,
even though the account balances
exceeded the amount ofthe checks.
The Bank had placed an "administrative hold" on both accQunts.
4

/d.

Pursuapt to an order of November
5, 1990, agreed to by 'the parties,
each party submitted a brief with
respect to the propriety of the administrative hold. In it~ brief, the
DIP argued that the Bank had no
right of setoff because the debts
owin'g to the Bank had not yet matured, that with respec} to the payroll account no right of setoff existed against the special deposits, and
that the administrative hold violated
the -automatic stay under Section
362(a)(7). 5 The Bank in respol'i'se
asserted that the DIP's note obligations were in default and the Bank
had a contractual right to set off the
funds on deposit through the use of
th~ administrative hold. The court
observed that the first issue was
whether the· administrative hold violated the stay imposed by Section
362.
While this question is the subject
of considerable debate, as discussed
below, it should be notep first that
the setoff of any debt does violate
the automatic stay. 1:1 U.S.C.
§ 362(a)(7). 6

The bankruptcy court discussed a
holding of the Court of Appeals for
the Sixth Circuit as to the three steps
that are necessary for a setoff to
occur: (1) the decision to exercise
the right of setoff; (2) some action
~/d. at 393. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(7):
"[A] petition filed under section 301, 302,
or 303 of this title ... operates as a stay ...
of-the setoff of any debt owing to the debtor
that arose before the commencement of the
case under this title against any claim against
the debtor .... "
6
127Bankr.at393.
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that accomplishes the setoff; and (3)
a record that evidenc~s that the right
of -setoff has been exercised. 7
''Therefore, in this Circuit an administrative hold alone does not
constitute a.setoff and is not prohibited by section 362(a)(7). " 8

Analyzing the 'holdings of the
courts on each side of the issue, the
bankruptcy court explained:
Those courts which find that an administrative hold d6es not violate the
automatic stay emphasize that such
action is not specified in section
362(a) and that banks must be able
to protect their rights of setoff which
are preserved by section 553 and
542(b). Courts reaching the opposite
conclusion emphasize the importance and broad scope of the automatic stay, especially section 362(a)(3),
and the fact that, at least from the
debtor's standpoint, an extended administrative hold is tantamount to a
completed setoff. Upon review, this
Court finds the latter to be the more
persuasive argument. 12

The Jurisdictions Are Split
Notwithstanding its own circuit's
definition of a setoff, the bankruptcy
court indicated that there is substantial dispute among the courts as to
whether an administrative freeze violates the automatic stay. Adding to
the controversial cases, the court
also noted that the issue has been
the subject of much discussion in
commentaries and scholarly jour. nals. 9 One commentator stated,
"[I]t should be clear that ~ simple
administrative hold by a bank creditor pending a resolution of a request
for relief under § 362(d) will not
violate the automatic stay.'' 1° Following the enumeration of authorities, the court noted "with some
embarrassment" that in the past it
has been persuaded by arguments
on both sides of this issue and has
rendered conflicting opinions. 11
7
/d. , quoting from Baker v. National
City Bank of Cleveland, 511 F.2d 1016,
·
1018. (6th Cir. 1975).
8
/d., citing In re Homan, 116 Bankr.
595,602 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1990).
9
/d., citing, inter alia, Weintraub &.
Resnick, "Freezing the Debtor's Account:
A Banker's Dilemma Under the Bankruptcy
Code," 100 Banking L.J. 316 (1983) (hereinafter Weintraub & Resnick).
10
/d. 2 L. King, Collier on Bankruptcy
, 362.04[7] (15th ed. 1990).
11
127 Bankr. at 393-394.
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The court was particularly impressed with the decision of Judge
Waldron in In re Homan, 13 which
concluded that an administrative
hold did not violate Section
362(a)(7)~ but heltl that such action
violated Section 362(a)(3), which
stays ''any act to obtain possession
of property of the estate or of property from the estate or to exercise
control over property of the estate.'' 14 The court noted that ''the
freeze is essentially an extra-judicial
temporary restraining order .... " 15
The bankruptcy court adopted
Judge Waldron's conclusion that a
12
13

/d. at 394.

116 Bankr. 595 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio
1990).
14
127 Bankr. at 394.
" ld. at 394, quoting from In re Wildcat
Constr. Co., 57 Bankr,.981 (Bankr. D. Vt.
1986).
~
.
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creditor coula not resort to self-help the debtor's accounts whereas,.the
to preserve-a claimed interest in the bank's security interest in those acdebtor's deposit account but that the counts was limited to the extent of its
required course of action was for right to setoff provided in Sections
the creditor to initiate a proceeding 363(a), 506(a); and -553. 18 "In the
to obtain relief from the automatic event that the Bank's rig~t of'Setoff
stay. This type of self-help could is less than the'balance of the deposit
create "significant economic havoc account, a bank which unilaterally
for a debtor who is. attempting to freezes the debtor's account reaches
reorganize in order to obtain the far beyond its rights ii} the cash
relief contemplated by .Chapters 11 collateral o:( the debtor.'' The court
or 12 and could have an even more indicated that_ situations of this naand disastrous result upon an indi- . ture would be' 'more egregious than
vidual debtor's efforts to obtain the in the present case and ~learly." a
19
relief contemplated by Chapter violation of the a~tomatic stay.
13."16
The court then found that the adThe court then considered the ministrative hold placed on the
debtor's restraints as to ,the use of DIP's account by the .Bank was a
cash collateral. The court observed violation of the automatic stay under
that pursuant to Sections 363(a) and Section 362(a)(3). Since ther~ was
363(c)(2), funds on deposit and sub- no assertion that the Bank had actual
ject to a right of setoff constituted knqwledge of the bankruptcy filing
cash collateral that the debtor may or that it acted willfully, the court
not use without the Bank's consent would not consider the issue of sanc20
or court authorization. The Bank tions.
argued that it was acting in accorA Practical Solution
dance with this section restricting
The court, however, x;ecognized
the debtor's use of cash collateral
the
practical problems that its holdby placing an administrative hold
ing
will present to banks and sugon the debtor's accounts.
gested
a procedure that financial
The court was not persuaded,
institutions
could utilize to overhowever, "that because a bank may
come
the
hazard
of violating the
be acting in conformity with one
automatic
stay.
The
court comparea
policy of the Bankruptcy Code, its
this
procedure
to
one
commonly utiactions are exempt from other pro17
lized
by
debtors-in-possession:
visions of the Code.'' Additionally, an administrative hold was genJust as debtors-in-possession often
erally absolute in applying to tlie
come before the court on an expeditentire account balance in each of
ed or emergency basis for a determi16
!d. at 394, quoting from In re Homan,
116 Bankr. at 603.
17
!d. at 395.

289

18
19

20

See 11 U .S.C. §§ 363(a), 506(a), 553.
127 Bankr. at 395.
See 11 U.S.C. § 362(h).
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nation regarding the use of cash collateral, there are also provisions in
the Bankruptcy Code and Rules for
the expeqitious consideration of a
motion for relief from stay. Bankruptcy Rule 4001(a)(3) provides for
ex parte relief from stay where i1llmediate and irreparable injury, loss, or
damage will result. 21

'

Although the court considered its
conclusion with respect to1he automatic stay significant in that it would
have an jmpact on future cases, it
commented that its practical effect
in the present' case was minimal
because of the second issue as to the
extent of the Bank's right of setoff in
the deposit accounts under Section '
553 and the prohibition of the debt>or's use of "cash collateral" by
Sections 363(a) and 363(c)(2). The
deposit accounts in question were
cash collateral ·because of the
Bank's secured claim to the extent
of its rigbt of setoff pursuant to
Seetion 506(a).
The court' was not persuaded by
the DIP's argument that there was
no right of setoff under Section 553
to the extent that the ·entire amount
of DIP's obligations was not due at
the time the petition was. filed. The
Bank's obligations were in default
and subject to acceleration at the
timeoffiling. "Furthermore, §~553
contemplates a ··netting' process
where the aggregate claims of the
parties are netted against one another. "22
21

127 Bankr. at 395.

22

/d. at 396.
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The court also rejected the DIP's
argument that pursuant to Ohio law,
the Bank had no right of setoff with
respect to the payroll account,
which was a special deposit account. The court treated this argument as irrelevant since the bankruptcy estate acquired an interest in
both deposit accounts at the time the
petition was filed. At that time. the
vast majority of the funds in question was in the general account ahd
became cash collateral ac that rnament. The current balance in the
payroll account actually included
the DIP's postpetition transfer of
funds from its general account that
was subject to the right of setoff.
This transfer constituted a use of
cash collateral without the Bank's
consent or court authorization.
Thus, with the exception of a small
sum in the payroll account, the remainder constituted cash collateral
subject to the Bank's right of setqff.
The court treated the DIP's rnation as one to use cash collateral. It
also considered the agreement of the
parties reflected in the court's prior
order as consent of t11e Bank to use
cash collateral. Alternatively, the
.court viewed the granting of a replacement lien as adequate protection of the Bank's interest as required by Section 363(e). The
court's prior order was continued in
effect unless the parties notified the
clerk of the court that a final hearing
on the use of cash collateral was
required.
The court did not conclude its
opinion without criticizing the DIP.
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account. " 27 Kenney's Frctnchise
had a factu~ pa!tem similar to the
one in Quality Interiors. There was
a loan agreement between the bank
and its depositor under which there
was a, balance due the bank of
$63,000, secured by equipment val·ued at $25,000. There was also a
checking account with a balance of
$12,000. Upon the filiJ;lg of the petition, the bank froze the account. The
debtor's trustee filed a complaint
seeking recovery of the $12,000.
The bank's answer and counterclaim alleged a banker's lien ~pon
the account and that it was entitled
to adequate protection pursuant to
Section 362(d):8 before the debtor
could have use of the funds, .Moreover, the property was '' casli collateral, " and therefore the debtor had
no right to use it without first obtaining a court order pursual}t to
Section 363(c)(2).
Conclusion
The bankruptcy court in Kenney's
Franchise
rejected the bank's arguAs we read In re Quality Interiment
that
the
freeze did not constiors, Inc. , a feeling of nostalgia takes
of a setoff because
tute
the
exercise
us back some eight years to our
25
the
balance
of
the
account was not
article in which we analyzed In
26
applied
to
the
debt.
The bank's failre Kenney's Franchise: "[O]ne of
ure
to
honor
checks
issued on the
the first decisions regarding a
account
was
sufficient
to constitute
bank's right to freeze a debtor's
the exercise of the right of setoff in
23
/d., citing In re Chateaugay Corp., 80 violation of the stay.
Bankr. 279 (S.D.N.Y. 1987); In re StructurWe criticized the holding in Kenlite Plastics Corp., 86 Bankr. 922 (Bankr.
ney's Franchise because its analysis
S.D. Ohio 1988). See also 11 U.S.C. § 105.
24
of the issue was seriously flawed.
/d. at396. See 11 U.S.C. § 549.
25
See Weintraub & Resnick, note 9 We commented that the Bankruptcy
supra.
Code is a complex web often requir26
See In re Kenney's Franchise 12

The funds transferred to the payroll
account one' day after the petition
was filed apparently were to be used
to pay prepetition wages. Such payment by a DIP outside a confirmed
plan of reorganization is generally
prohibited by the Bankruptcy Code
and such transfers are recoverable.
The court did recognize that a '' general practice has developed, howev-er, where bankruptcy courts permit
the payment of certain prepetition
claim&., pursuant to 11 U .S.C.
§ 105, where the debtor will be unable to reorganize without such payment. " 23 The court also stated that
it often permitted the p_ayment of
prepetition wages so as to allow a
DIP to maintain an effeetive work.
fore~, but "in no event may such
payments be made without prior authorization from the bankruptcy
court. '' 24

Bankr. 390 (W.D. Va. 1981), aff'd, Civ.
No. 81-0259 (W.Va. Mar. 24, 1982), rev'd
on reargument, 22 Bankr. 747 (W.D. Va.
1982).

27
See Weintraub & Resnick, note 9
supra, at319.
28
See 11 U.S.C. § 362(d).
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so many others faced by this court,
is complicated by competing policies of the Bankruptcy Code. " 30 We
see no competing policy if the bank
is permitted to maintain the status
quo with a temporary admini~trative
hold until the DIP assumes the initiative to obtain court approval for
the use of cash collateral. Failing
to act, the Bank should not be in
violation of the automatic stay because of the "freeze" or "administrative hold.''
We also find an informative analWhen, however, setoff rights are ysis supporting our view that all the
viewed as secured claims under sec- applicable sections of the Bankrupttion 506(a) and the deposited funds cy COde, not only Section 362, must
are treated-as cash collateral pursuant be considered when determining
to Section 363(c)(2), the right of the whether an administrative hold by a
trustee or debtor to. have use of the . bank of a debtor's deposit account
bank account balance without judi- constitutes a violation of the autocial approval; is no greater than the matic stay. We refer to Mr. Justice
bank's right to withhold the funds. Scalia's analysis of the concept of
Thus, a temporary freeze should be
''an interest in property'' under sevpermissible pending a subsequent deeral sections of tlie Bankruptcy
termination of the bank's protection
Code in the Tinihers case: "Statutoupon the debtor's request for use of
ry construction, however, is a holis29
the funds ... ,
tic endeavor. A provision that seems
The court in puality Interiors said ambiguous in isolation is often clarithat "[t]he issues presented in this fied by the remainder of the statuto31
case are relatively simple; however, ry scheme ....
the .resolution of these issues, like
30
127 Bankr. at 392.

ing the conciliation· of numerous
sections to arrive at a determination
of rights. The bankruptcy court in
Kenney's Franchise considered
only Section553(a), recognizing the
right of setoff by a creditor, and
Section 362(a)(7) applying the automatic stay to setoffs. However, the
court failed to recognize setoffs as
secured claims under Section 506(a)
and the deposited funds as constituting cash collateral under Section
363(c)(2).

29

See Weintraub & Resnick, note 9
supra, at 324.

31
SeeUnitedSav.Ass'nofTex.v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., Ud., 108 S.
Ct. 626 ( 1988).

292

